From: Rob Shein (shoten@starpower.net)
Date: Fri Jan 23 2004 - 16:38:43 EST
Policy strength (there might be no policy requiring password changes, or
there might be one, which isn't enforced), internal controls (what if an
employee hacks from inside...then what?), contractor handling, mostly other
policy-related things come to mind. It's also hard to be sure how good
their response to incidents is as well, since a pen-tester will (hopefully)
avoid doing many things that a malicious hacker would do, even deliberately.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pete Herzog [mailto:pete@isecom.org]
> Sent: Friday, January 23, 2004 3:32 PM
> To: Jeff Shawgo; pen-test@securityfocus.com
> Subject: What a security test should do?- from thinking
> about: Ethical Hacking Training
>
>
> What does a pen test fail to provide?
>
> I had to think about this for a little while because it's not
> so much to me what someone needs to know to be a security
> manager, CISO, or security consultant, but rather what do we
> expect from a security test?
>
> I know what pen-tests have been used for but I think a lot of
> that is also under-analyzing the results of a pen-tset. As
> an auditor of pen-test reports for some companies, I see many
> of these reports focusing on software vulnerabilities, the
> occassional rooting of boxes, and the holy trilogy of web app
> hacks (XSS, Command Injection, Buffer Overflows). Most
> reports will have a traceroute to each host in the network
> but not even say why or what that is useful for. So in the
> end these reports leave a lot of analysis up to the client
> and if they are not capable of this kind of analysis, the
> report has much less worth.
>
> I have felt that security tests should do more. They should
> test configurations and policies as well. A test may tell
> you, for example, about patch management, which department
> influences the company's Internet presence, and if the
> firewall admin has top-level support or a policy to follow
> regarding opening new ports. All of these things may
> negatively influence the strength of network security in ways
> that make it just as vulnerable as a remote service exploit.
>
> As Jeff mentions here, there is a lot more to network
> security than pen-testing but for the most part, testing
> should be also able to verify when the foundation is rotten.
>
> So my question is, what parts of security can't be verified
> in a security test? No flames please-- I'm just trying to
> make the OSSTMM (osstmm.org) better.
>
> Sincerely,
> -pete.
>
> Pete Herzog, Managing Director
> Institute for Security and Open Methodologies
> www.isecom.org - www.osstmm.org
> www.hackerhighschool.org - www.isestorm.org
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jeff Shawgo [mailto:jeff.shawgo@verizon.net]
> > Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2004 18:46 PM
> > To: pen-test@securityfocus.com
> > Subject: Re: Ethical Hacking Training
> >
> > On the other hand, most people also forget that knowing how
> to perform
> > a pen-test or exploit is only one very very tiny aspect of
> security.
> > The organization that has a solid policy, coordinated antivirus,
> > well-managed firewalls, patch management policy, e-mail and web
> > filtering, code review, and basic system hardening is likely to be
> > many times more secure than the organization that focuses
> on *any* one
> > individual's skill as a pen-tester.
> >
> > If the security foundation is rotten, it does little good
> to point out
> > that the windows are unlocked.
> >
> > Pen-testing is important, but the basics need to be there first.
> > That's the message most people are missing - probably
> because it's not
> > as attractive.
> >
> > ~Jeff
> >
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