From: Mark Wolfgang (moonpie@moonpie.org)
Date: Mon Jul 14 2003 - 11:49:18 EDT
I agree that it shouldn't be too difficult for the right person to
write some tools based around the control network protocols, but this
of course takes time and more importantly, money. The vendors have
little motivation to do this unless some big hand forces them to do
so. Heck, we can't even get the vendors to bring Operating Systems up
to the current patch level before deploying them.
Many control systems I've seen are things like stock Solaris 2.6 boxes
running critical apps. This may have been OK when SCADA systems where
completely closed systems, but current trends indicate this is a thing
of the past.
While conducting an assessment at an ISO last year they were talking
about implementing a new EMS and we spoke at length about how they
should require the vendor to implement security into the new SCADA system or the deal is off.
Requirements to the vendor such as:
- there shall be no extraneous services running on systems
- systems shall be brought up to the current patch level
- the vendor shall supply patches to the client in regards to security
and bug fixes
This may answer the question for new systems, but demanding this from
vendors for older systems might not go over well.
The original question remains unanswered...
-Mark
On Thu, Jul 10, 2003 at 09:38:40PM -0500 or thereabouts, Matthew Franz wrote:
> Back to the original question...
>
> If one were to bracket off on the "normal IT security stuff"--which
> existing tools would cover (assuming they didn't bring down the control
> system network and life as we know it) it wouldn't be terribly difficult
> to write some tools that scanned industrial devices, at least the
> Ethernet-enabled ones.
>
> Many of these "obscure" protocols are even less secure than the *least*
> secure Internet protocols we know and love. Stuff that formerly ran on
> [closed] RS-232/485 or field-bus (or whatever) networks has been plopped on
> top of TCP/IP with no way to do even weak authentication or authorization.
> Never mind the oh-so-popular embedded web servers that give out loads of
> information about the devices in question (also without
> authentication)....
>
> Among security-minded folks in the control system community there is
> simultaneous frustration that these vulnerabilities aren't taken being
> seriously by users and vendors, yet great fear of releasing any detailed
> information about vulnerabilities in applications, protocols, or devices.
>
> And what independent/academic/corporate researcher would release even the
> most benign auditing tools due to the fear of being branded a threat to
> national security?
>
> - mdf
>
> ---------
> Hi,
>
> I agree with Mark.
> I have had the same experiances with SCADA reviews in that the many of
> the risks asssociated in IT/business reviewes are that same.
>
> One thing that you need to be aware of is that generally SCADA networks
> have been implemented to be functional not secure and the SCADA
> management staff maintain the operational aspects of the systems, rerely
> implementing good business proctices and/or proactive monitoring. i.e.
> BCP/DRP/BIA/TRA, Intrusion Detection, patching/hotfixes.
> This is normally because these systems are built and managed by
> engineering staff and because of the operational integrity needs, don't
> want the corporate playing around with them...
>
> There are some basic things that should be done within SCADA networks,
> but in addition to the things we generally look at, all SCADA enviroments
> are different, so you need to keep open minded. i.e. Radio (private,
> 802.11, etc.), IP tunneling, isolation of business from SCADA networks,
> restriction of commands/devives available to the general network,
> restrict unauthenticated PBX modems, etc.
>
> Also the hardware manufactureres have not been helpful in providing
> devices (RTU,PLC, etc.) which are supportive of these critical systems.
>
> Anyway have fun.
> Derek
>
> ------------ Original Message --------------
> From: Mark Wolfgang <moonpie@moonpie.org>
> to: Alfred Huger <ah@securityfocus.com>
> cc: pen-test@securityfocus.com
> Subject: Re: SCADA Auditing Tools
>
>
> Most of the SCADA/EMS/DCS audits I've done have been more risk-based
> (policy driven) than technical approaches due to the chance of
> crashing some old system that can't handle a bunch of SYN packets.
>
> The technical auditing I've done use many of the same tools as a
> normal pen test, but I'll be a LOT more gentle and specific in what
> I'm doing. I won't even portscan operational systems...no
> thanks...don't want the liability. Of course there are systems in a
> SCADA network that aren't absolutely critical for plant operations
> (such as PI servers) that can be hammered pretty hard using
> traditional methods.
>
> I try to think of SCADA as "system", much like any other information
> system. It
> has traditionally spoken more obscure protocols, such as modbus, ICCP,
> and DNP, but is moving to more common protocol stacks such as
> IP. This is sort of dangerous, in that now all of the IP based
> vulnerabilities accompany this migration. Of course, security by
> obscurity was never a good approach anyway.
>
> -Mark
>
> On Wed, Jul 09, 2003 at 11:19:42AM -0600 or thereabouts, Alfred Huger
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Hey all,
> >
> > Does anyone out there know of any commercial or free SCADA auditing
> tools?
> > I've looked around and found very little and while I know there are
> > private tools out there I am interested in hearing about those which the
> > public can get their hands on.
> >
> > Some resources I have found which are pretty decent are:
> >
> > http://scada.trinux.org/
> > http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1525/SCADA%20Security/Rtcrypto=SCADA-
> code.ppt
> > http://www.plantdata.com/SCADA%20Security%20Strategy.pdf
> > http://www.io.com/~mdfranz/papers/franz-API-future-of-scada-security.ppt
> >
> http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/sub/wgc3/c37sections/clause5/clause5_3_secu
> rity/Substations%20communications%20system%20security%20D1r2.pdf
> >
> >
> > -al
> >
> > Alfred Huger
> > Symantec Corp.
>
>
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